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This paper develops a link between four central 
components of the demographic transition: survival rates; 
fertility decisions; altruistic intergenerational transfers 
from workers toward their parents; and economic 
growth. An increase in child survival is found to reduce 
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the fertility rate and altruistic transfers, and thereby 
increase the savings rate and the productivity growth rate. 
The analysis illustrates the key role of child health in the 
demographic transition.  
 
HEALTH, DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND  
ECONOMIC GROWTH1 
 























JEL Classification: H55, I18, J13, O11, O16, O41 
Keywords: Health, Mortality, Endogenous Fertility, Demographic Transition, 
Endogenous Economic Growth 
 
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Jocelyn Finlay and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen for excellent comments and valuable discussions. 
Furthermore, I thank Michele Gragnolati, Jan Walliser, Tito Cordella, Makhtar Diop, Rodrigo Chaves, Dino 
Merotto, Oded Galor, David Bloom, and David Canning for helpful comments.  
2 The World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, LCSPE, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, 
D.C., 20433, USA, Email: ojorgensen@worldbank.org, Tel.: 202-458-0532, Fax.: 202-522-2119.   2
1. Introduction 
Most countries have seen child and adult survival rates increase during the first stage of their 
demographic transition. This has usually been followed by a decline in fertility in the second stage and, 
thus, strongly decreasing dependency ratios. As a result, the demographic transition provides a 
window of opportunity for economic growth by releasing resources for capital savings and human 
capital formation. According to Bloom and Williamson (1998) approximately one-third of the increase 
in economic growth for the East-Asian “tigers” can be explained by purely demographic factors, i.e. the 
declines in mortality and fertility. This demographic “dividend” therefore entails a real chance to 
reduce poverty. 
This paper considers an increase in survival rates for both children and adults, and traces the 
effects through the key mechanisms in the economies of less developed countries (LDCs): fertility 
decisions, altruistic intergenerational transfers and capital savings. These mechanisms translate a 
change in health conditions into prospects for economic growth. The existing literature has already 
analyzed some of these components together, but has failed to include them all into one unified 
framework. It would be too simplistic, in the context of LDCs, not to incorporate one or more of these 
central mechanisms when analyzing the first stage of the demographic transition with reductions in 
(child) mortality. The present analysis features, therefore, one possible channel for the trade-off 
between children and capital as savings mechanisms when child survival increases. To our knowledge, 
this has not been attempted before. 
Capital savings are a key variable in an economy’s demographic transition towards sustained 
economic growth.3 In a model with exogenous fertility and without the care by workers for the 
subsistence of their parents, Chakraborty (2004) finds that a higher adult survival rate will increase 
the capital stock and per capita income. The reason is that capital savings increase when people expect 
a longer retirement period.4 However, in LDCs, children can also be considered a form of savings 
because they tend to care for their parents in old age, i.e. the higher number of children per household 
the more altruistic transfers can be expected in old age (Ehrlich and Lui, 1991). 
In order to trace the effects on capital savings, these mechanisms should be accounted for in the 
analytical framework. We accomplish this by endogenizing fertility and altruistic intergenerational 
transfers. Consequently, the net effect on capital savings may not necessarily be an increase, because 
workers may choose to “save” through having more children and, in turn, dis-save through capital. The 
result in Chakraborty (2004), that improved health conditions will increase capital savings and 
economic growth, may therefore not hold when the economy is modeled with endogenous fertility 
decisions and altruistic transfers—in accordance the empirical observations in LDCs (see, e.g., 
Caldwell, 1982). 
                                                 
3 Increased capital savings will produce a higher capital-labor ratio and, in line with standard growth theory (see, 
e.g., Diamond, 1965), also the potential for higher per capita output. 
4 In Chakraborty’s model, investments in health increase proportionally to the increasing income, which in turn 
leads to a longer life span. So the economy enters a positive spiral of better health, longer lives, more capital 
savings, and higher per capita income.   3
In addition to our personal joy of having children, to which we seem to be more or less genetically 
programmed (Dasgupta, 1993; p. 356), the motivation for having children can indeed be considered an 
economic one. Children can provide labor that will benefit the household; they can provide care for 
parents in old age; and they may be an instrument of altruism from parent to child (Barro and Becker, 
1989). Another motivation for having children is the expectation of receiving altruistic 
intergenerational transfers from one’s children after retirement (Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; Wigger, 2002). 
Higher capital savings would substitute these intergenerational transfers to the effect of lowering the 
transfer rate and further reducing the need for having children as an old age security “device”.5  
Concurrent with the child survival response, parents also face the quantity/ quality trade-off 
(Galor and Weil, 1996, 2000). With a fixed amount of resources available to devote to the children of 
the household, parents make the decision to have many (few) children and invest little (more) in each. 
The incentive for the latter will grow as the return to human capital increases parallel to the 
technological development. In this paper, we abstract from human capital investments since the effects 
thereof are well established.  
Improved adult health (proxied in the literature by higher life expectancy; longer retirement 
period) is generally found to have an increasing effect on output per capita (see, e.g., Bloom et al., 
2007, Chakraborty, 2004, Jensen and Jorgensen, 2008, Jorgensen and Jensen, 2009). In the presence 
of perfect capital markets and no social security arrangement, we would envision longer life 
expectancy to have no effect on the savings rate as the extension of working life is proportional to the 
extension of life expectancy. However, in the presence of social security arrangements, where the 
retirement age is fixed, an increase in life expectancy increases the years of retirement 
disproportionately to the working years. This is a case where the intertemporal prices of consumption 
in the first relative to the second period change, and if they do not change in equal proportions then 
the savings rate will be affected (Chang, 1990; Jensen and Jorgensen, 2008, Jorgensen and Jensen, 
2009).6 
Higher adult survival can also have incentive effects that may be important for capital savings: 
investments in human capital will be encouraged as the time horizon over which returns to investment 
can be earned is extended (Weil, 2007; Finlay, 2006). Adult survival may also represent a proxy for 
experience: the longer one is alive the larger the work experience. Although this theory is dispelled by 
Bloom et al. (2004), who control for labor market experience, they found that increased adult survival 
                                                 
5 The choice of how many children to have is, to a large extent, a function of child survival (Pritchett, 1994; Barro 
and Becker, 1989) and of access to family planning (Bongaarts, 1990, 1994). A family plan to have their desired 
number of (live) children, and in an environment of high child mortality the differential between the number of 
desired children and births widens (Fink, 2007). As the child survival rate improves, families need fewer births to 
achieve their desired number of children. 
6 The retirement age as a policy instrument could be adjusted to offset this effect (Jensen and Jorgensen, 2008, 
and Jorgensen and Jensen, 2009). Bloom et al. (2005) show, however, that this life-cycle savings model is 
incomplete, and that an increase in life expectancy can actually have a negative effect on the savings rate. They 
argue that if the retirement age is endogenously determined, then a rise in life expectancy may lead to a more or 
less than proportional rise in the retirement age so the effect on the savings rate is ambiguous. This result is 
driven by a wealth effect of the longer working life. Jorgensen and Jensen (2009) finds a similar result in a model 
with endogenous labor supply, where the wealth effect due to distortionary taxation more than outweighs the sum 
of substitution and income effects when life expectancy increases.   4
had a positive effect on savings and economic growth. Alternatively, if adult survival is considered a 
proxy for health, then better health can lead to higher worker productivity and promote economic 
growth (Barro and Lee, 1994; Bloom et al., 2004; Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Finlay, 2006).  
While existing literature mainly studies changes in adult survival as a proxy for life expectancy, 
this paper separates the effects from higher child survival and adult survival, respectively. Thereby, 
we can isolate the unique effects from each survival rate on variables central to the demographic 
transition. The economic implications of changes in child survival have been explored to a much lesser 
extent than adult survival in the theoretical literature. To account for this shortcoming, this paper 
illustrates a channel of dynamics that can unfold, in which the motivation for having children will 
shape the resource allocation through endogenous fertility decisions. The child and adult survival rates 
are incorporated into the working and retirement periods, respectively, as implicit prices on 
consumption. This framework is combined with altruistic transfers from working age members of the 
household to their retired parents.  
While others have modeled endogenous fertility decisions together with both one-sided and two-
sided altruistic intergenerational transfers (see, e.g., Blackburn and Cipriani, 2005), nobody has 
incorporated survival rates in the context of both endogenous fertility decisions and altruistic 
transfers. Adult survival rates have frequently been incorporated into life-cycle models (see, e.g., 
Blackburn and Cipriani, 1998, 2002; Bohn, 2001; Chakraborty, 2004; Jorgensen and Jensen, 2009) but 
have not been analyzed in conjunction with altruistic transfers. This paper brings together this 
literature by combining these elements into a unified endogenous growth model. 
Having explored the theoretical benefits of improved survival rates, we then take this a step 
further and ask: Can economic policy be targeted at health interventions in order to provide incentives 
for having fewer children, and could such a fertility decline potentially promote higher per capita 
economic growth? Assuming that better health is the cause of increasing survival rates, we trace 
increases in the child survival rate, as well as the adult survival rate, to their impacts upon fertility, 
altruistic transfers, capital savings and economic growth, respectively.  
We next consider how public pay-as-you-go pensions can potentially reduce the need for children 
as an old age security device, and through these dynamics increase capital savings and economic 
growth. It is well known that pensions crowd out the physical capital stock, but in a setup with 
children as a savings mechanism the reduction in household savings may be directed towards children 
rather than towards capital. As a result, if fertility is high then capital accumulation may also be 
higher than previously believed because altruistic intergenerational transfers are operative at low 
levels of development. This issue was also addressed by Wigger (2002), but he does not incorporate 
survival rates into his model and is therefore not in a position to study the demographic transition 
(triggered by low child mortality) and the implications for sustained growth it entails. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 the model is outlined, and in section 3 there is 
solved for the competitive equilibrium. Comparative statics are then conducted in section 4, where 
exogenous increases are imposed in, first, the child survival rate and, second, the adult survival rate. 
Next, the experiment with a composite increase in the child and adult survival rates is performed.   5
Finally, section 5 provides perspectives on the potential of public pensions to promote the dynamics of 
the demographic transition, discusses some model limitations, and provides suggestions for future 
research. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The  Model 
The overlapping generations (OLG) model is outlined in this section. We owe the basic structure of the 
model to Wigger (2002), who incorporates altruism and endogenous fertility decisions into an OLG 
model, ad modum Diamond (1965), which leads to an old age security motive for having children.7 Our 
model extends this structure by incorporating child and adult survival rates, respectively. We assume 
that improved health conditions generate higher survival rates.8 We follow Jorgensen and Jensen 
(2009) in their incorporation of the survival rates in order to analyze their impact on savings, fertility 
and economic growth. The model consists of different building blocks: demographics, budget 
constraints, household behavior and technology. We present these in turn, before outlining the solution 
method in section 3. 
 
2.1 Demographics 
Individuals are assumed to live, as shown in Figure 1, for three periods: as children, as working age 
adults, and as retired adults. 
 








Parents are assumed to make economic decisions on behalf of their children. The child survival rate, 
0<μ1≤1, is assumed to denote the survival of children immediately before they enter the labor force as 
adult workers. In that way, a higher μ1 translates into a larger labor force. A higher adult survival 
rate, 0<μ2≤1, is incorporated such that more workers survive into retirement. Labor is inelastically 
supplied by workers, Nt, and is assumed to grow by 1+nt-1= Nt/(μ1Nt-1), where n>-1 is the growth rate. If 
child survival or fertility increases then the labor force will grow at a higher rate. 
                                                 
7 Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) also investigate the dynamics of fertility and altruistic intergenerational 
transfers in the context of the demographic transition. Neither they nor Wigger (2002) incorporate survival rates 
(or length of life) into their models. As a result, they are unable to investigate the role of child mortality in the 
first phase of the demographic transition. This is exactly the link that this paper provides. 
8 We do not, however, incorporate a government health sector or private investments in health. Higher 
health investments would otherwise be expected to increase survival rates in line with Chakraborty (2004), but 
since we are interested in a closed form solution for key variables, which Chakraborty does not provide, a 
framework with endogenous health expenditure that endogenously affects survival rates will remain an issue for 
our future research. 
Working age 
Child survival rate 
μ1 
Adult survival rate 
μ2 
Retirement  Childhood   6
2.2 Budget  constraints 
Workers earn wages, wt, and choose savings, St, in accordance with (1). 
    11 1( 1 ) tt tt t Sz n w c        (1) 
Different costs must be serviced by workers: first, there exists a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system 
with a contribution rate, θ.9 Secondly, the cost of raising (1+nt) number of children is denoted by κwt, 
where κ is the share of income that covers the costs per child. Consequently, if either the number of 
children per household increases, if the cost of rearing a child increases, or if pension contributions 
increase, there will be less income available for first period consumption, c1t, and savings. 
Workers are assumed to be altruistic towards the subsistence of their retired parents, to whom 
they have the option of transferring income (gifts). If, however, retirees already have enough 
consumption, and thus adequate utility, workers will reduce the gift rate, zt, to whichever level their 
degree of altruism supports. Second period consumption, c2t+1, is determined in (2) by last period’s 
savings that yield a gross return of Rt=1+rt. 
  
1
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

      (2) 
An increase in μ2 would force more retired members of the household to spend their savings at a lower 
rate, 1/μ2. Retirees may receive altruistic transfers from their working age children, depending on the 
number of children they have and the wage rate. Consequently, the more children you have to support 
you in old age, the more altruistic transfers you will probably receive. An additional child will provide 
you with more intergenerational gifts in old age, but you also have to support them whilst working, 
implying less consumption and capital savings. The trade-off therefore (also) depends upon the fact 
that children possess the same degree of altruism as you, so that you can be certain to receive in old 
age what you expected when deciding on your number of children.10 Finally, retirees receive variable 
pension benefits in accordance with the PAYG system in (3) 
  21 tt t t t wN wN      (3) 













   (4) 
In case retirees face a higher survival rate they are forced to spend their benefits at a lower rate. When 
children, on the other hand, face a higher survival rate, the labor force increases and more workers 
will pay fixed contributions to the PAYG system. This will allow their retired parents to spend pension 
benefits at a higher rate. Equivalently, if workers decide to have more children, they can also expect 
higher pension benefits in old age.11 
                                                 
9 A very small contribution rate is assumed in line with the features of pension schemes in developing economies. 
10 This is in principle a game-theoretic issue as analyzed by, e.g., Zhang and Nishimura (1993) and Nishimura and 
Zhang (1995). In this paper it is assumed that all generations are equally altruistic. 
11 The PAYG system does not necessarily need to be characterized by fixed contributions. It could also be a fixed 
benefits system, where the contribution rate is flexible. The PAYG system would then be re-stated as 
2




    . This would imply that if workers had more children, or if the child survival rate decreased, they   7
2.3 Household  behavior 
The utility of individuals in (5) is assumed to, first, be composed of c1t and c2t+1, where ρ>-1 is the 
discount rate: 
    11 2 2 1 ln ln(1 ) ln tt t t uc n c         (5) 
Secondly, workers are assumed to be “genetically programmed” to value children (Dasgupta, 1993, p. 
356), where φ>0 is the weight on children in utility. Children are therefore (also) considered to be 
“consumption equivalent” goods. The idea to incorporate survival rates into the utility function is 
inspired by Jorgensen and Jensen (2009), such that if μ1 (μ2) increases, more workers (retirees) will 
survive to enjoy consumption and children. The altruistic element in (6) is captured by 
  tt t Uu u     (6) 
where χ measures the degree of altruism from workers towards their retired parents, by weighting 
your parents’ utility relative to your own. The number of children is therefore determined by two 
fertility motives: the ”genetic motive” and the ”savings motive”, where the former is incorporated in the 
positive effect of children in utility (5), while the latter arises through (6) because parents are assumed 
to be certain that their children will support them in old age.12 
 
2.4  Technology 
The production structure is also based on Wigger (2002) and assumes the endogenous growth set-up 
inspired by Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). Identical firms are assumed to employ labor and capital, 
t K , in order to produce output,  t Y , in accordance with a standard production:  (, ) tt t t YF K A N  , which 
is assumed to have constant returns to scale. Labor productivity,  t A , is endogenized by assuming a 
linear relationship in (7) between productivity and capital per worker due to a positive spill-over 








  (7) 
where  0    is a positive technology parameter. This means that  () (, 1 ) tt f kF k  , and that the capital 
stock in efficiency units is  / tt t t kK A N  , such that the interest rate is  '( ) tt rf k  , and the wage rate is 
  () ' () tt ttt wA f k k f k . This Arrow-Romer approach implies that the interest rate is constant, and 
that the wage rate is determined by 







     (8) 
where    () ' () / ff       is the “external return” on capital caused by the spill-over of cumulated 
investment upon labor productivity (see Wigger, 2002). Consequently, if  t N  rises the capital-labor 
                                                                                                                                                                
would not receive more in pension benefits anyway, since the rate, λ, would be fixed. Therefore, there would be no 
need to have more children for that reason, so fertility might fall. This is an issue for our future research. 
12 This is in terms of voluntary intergenerational gifts and statutory fixed pension contributions.   8
ratio will fall and the economy-wide level of technology will decrease: then  t A  falls and  t k  will remain 
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 (9) 
and is determined by the growth in endogenous production factors. The capital market equilibrium 
condition in (10) completes our model: 
  1 tt t K NS    (10) 
 
2.5  The competitive equilibrium 
In this section we derive and interpret the first order conditions of the individual optimization 
problem. We furthermore transform the model into a reduced form system of equations, in terms of the 
variables we are interested in, which fully describes the dynamic path of the economy. Our results are 
similar to those of Wigger (2002), on which we build our formal analysis, but all expressions are now 
adjusted for the child and adult survival rates. To our knowledge, this extension is unique. 
By combining (5) and (6), individuals face the following optimization problem where aggregate 
utility in (11) is maximized subject to the intertemporal budget constraint in (12): 
    12 2 1 2 2 max ln ln 1 ln ln tt t t t Uc n c c               (11) 
 Subject  to    
22 2
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
 (12) 
Assuming an internal solution the first order conditions hold with equality. The first optimality 














   (13) 
The second optimality condition is more complicated: 
  12 1 1 3 tt t tt t uw u zw u      (14) 
The fraction u1tφwt in (14) determines the opportunity cost of having an additional child, measured in 
terms of the marginal value of the lost first period consumption. The right-hand side shows the sum of 
two components: the marginal value of the gifts that current workers will receive from their children 
in the next period, and the marginal value of having another child. Altogether (14) shows the benefits 
and losses of having another child in terms of marginal utilities u1t, u2t and u3t. By substituting these, 
we find a positive correlation between fertility and first period consumption in (15) 
 










 (15)   9
and thus an inverse relationship between fertility and savings. The third optimality condition (16) 
describes your trade-off between consuming an additional unit yourself and transferring that unit for 












     (16) 
A higher degree of altruism, χ, and a larger adult survival rate (an increase in μ2) induce workers to 
value their parents’ marginal utility of consumption to a greater extent. If you have many siblings 
(1+nt-1) is large) who cooperate in supporting your parents, less of your income is needed to support 
them, and they consequently become “cheaper” to care for. This means that the “price” of supporting 
your parents goes down, and you choose to shift consumption from yourself to your parents. 
In this paper we are mainly interested in interpreting the effects of changes in survival rates on 
the variables: fertility rate, n, productivity growth rate, g, savings rate, s, and the altruistic gift rate, z. 
The Arrow-Romer production structure allows us to derive the savings rate in (17) by combining (10) 
with (7) 
   
1 11 tt t sg n


   (17) 
For developing countries we would be interested in seeing an increase in capital savings. The direct 
positive effect on the savings rate of a change in child survival is evident from (17), but the net effects 
on the savings level will become clear in our later derivations in general equilibrium. We therefore 
solve the model by reducing it to a system of equations in the variables g, n and z: substitute into the 
optimality conditions (13)—(16) the constraints (1) and (2), the wage rate (8) and the constant interest 
rate, the pension benefit rate (4) and, finally, the capital market equilibrium condition in (10). Note, 
that the resulting expressions in (18), (19), and (20) incorporate the child and adult survival rates: 
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 (20) 
                                                 
13 The third optimality condition in (16) is derived by lagging c2t+1 to be c2t and subsequently combining the 
resulting expression with IBC in (12) over ztwt.   10
This procedure has defined the competitive equilibrium as a sequence of only  0 , ,  tt t t ngz

 : fertility, 
productivity growth and altruistic gifts. It is our aim, in the following section, to analyze the effects of 
the higher survival rates on these three key variables. 
 
3. Comparative  Statics 
The purpose of this section is to apply our model to study the effects of higher child and adult survival 
rates on fertility, productivity growth and altruistic intergenerational transfers. We first derive a 
closed form solution for those variables. 
 
3.1 Fertility,  productivity  growth and altruistic transfers 
To derive a closed form solution for the three key variables (z, g and n) in order to perform comparative 
statics on the balanced growth path, we employ the steady state versions of (18), (19) and (20).14 It is 
clear that the survival rates (μ1 and μ2) affect their steady state paths.15 The expressions are identical 
to those in Wigger (2002), with the exception that ours are adjusted for the child and adult survival 
rates, respectively: 
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   (23) 
The purpose of the following three subsections is to interpret these relationships—both theoretically 
and numerically. The aim is then to employ them in policy reflections on savings, fertility and 
economic growth. This involves calibrating the model using what is believed to be realistic parameter 
values in Table 1. We initially calibrate the child and adult survival rates by μ1=1 and μ2=1, but in the 
simulations experiments are conducted with increases in these rates. In section 4.2 we study increases 
in only the child survival rate, while in section 4.3 only the adult survival rate is assumed to increase. 





                                                 
14 To obtain the steady state version of (20), divide (18) by (20) such that the resulting expression, χμ2(1+n)(1+g)= 
(1+r), relates the return to savings to the economy’s growth factor in steady state, (1+n)(1+g), scaled by the degree 
of altruism and the adult survival rate. 
15 To derive z in (21), insert the steady state version of (19) and (20) into the steady state version of (18) and 
isolate z. The productivity growth rate, g, in (22) is found by isolating g in the steady state version of (18). By 
combining (22) with the steady state version of (20) we arrive at the expression for fertility in (23).   11
Table 1. Calibration of the Model 
Parameter Calibration  Interpretation 
   0.9  Degree of altruism 
1    1 Child  survival  rate 
2    1 Adult  survival  rate 
   0.8 Consumption  discount  rate 
   0.4  Weight on children in utility 
r  4 Interest  rate 
   0.1  PAYG contribution rate 
   0.1  Cost of rearing a child 




3.2 Child  health 
In this section we simulate the impact of an increase in the child survival rate, μ1, on four variables: 
the productivity growth rate, g, the fertility rate, n, the altruistic gift rate, z, and the savings rate, s. 
The impact on these four variables is illustrated in Figures 2 through 5. 
We identify three key effects that govern the dynamics of the model when μ1 increases: first, 
when more members of the household survive, consumption must also be divided among those 
additional members. This yields less individual first period consumption, and consequently renders 
second period consumption more attractive in comparison. Equivalently, the relative price of first to 
second period consumption increases at the same rate as μ1 increases (see the intertemporal budget 
constraint in (12). Therefore, the savings rate in (17) increases proportionally to the increase in μ1 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Child Survival & Saving Rate  Figure 3. Child Survival & Productivity 
   
Source: Author  Source: Author 
 
Second, the costs of using children as an indirect savings mechanism (rather than saving through 
capital investments) will increase because the savings rate and thus wages and productivity increase. 
This increases the opportunity cost of rearing children, and thus renders children less attractive as an 
old age savings mechanism, given the constant return on capital savings. Third, individuals gain 





for first period consumption so savings fall. These three key effects yield an ambiguous net result on 
savings, but our simulations show that the two positive effects outweigh the single negative effect. 
A larger steady state capital stock generates knowledge spillovers and increases labor 
productivity in Figure 3, in accordance with (22). There is an offsetting effect, however, because the 
size of the labor force also increases when more children survive into the working age. This reduces, 
but does not dominate, the effect on wages and the productivity growth rate. Since it is costly to rear 
children for the purpose of providing for old age consumption, the need for children as a savings device 
falls when savings, and thus second period income, increase. This exerts downward pressure on 
fertility, (1+n) (Figure 4). For the same reason the altruistic gift rate also decreases (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4. Child Survival & Fertility  Figure 5. Child Survival & Transfers 
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There are consequently feedback mechanisms through savings and fertility: the more μ1 increases, the 
more the savings rate and productivity growth will increase, and the more fertility and altruistic gifts 
decrease. When fertility falls, more resources are released for consumption and savings, so the capital 
stock increases and further enhances productivity growth. 
An additional mechanism through which second period income increases is the PAYG system. In 
accordance with (4), the more μ1 increases, the higher will be the number of workers who pay fixed 
pension contributions—leading to higher benefits per retiree. This increases second period income, and 
reduces the altruistic transfers through less need for costly children as a savings mechanism. In this 
case where pension contributions are fixed, current workers know that the more children they have, 
the higher will be the number of future workers to pay fixed contributions to them—generating more 
retirement benefits. This effect is an additional element that causes high fertility, but even though a 
system with fixed contributions is included in Wigger (2002), Wigger does not analyze this link, and so 
leaves out the importance of the incentives for high fertility caused by the fixed contributions—and the 
potential gains of switching regime to a fixed benefits PAYG system.16 
                                                 
16 The latter argument implies that, no matter how many children workers have, the old age pension benefits will 
remain the same. Incorporating such a system will lead to two important effects: first, the fertility incentive of 
pension benefits is removed so fertility (and therefore also altruistic gifts) can be expected to fall and productivity 
growth can be expected to increase. Second, if workers need fewer children to finance old age consumption, they 





3.3 Adult  health 
This section provides the other leg of interpreting health improvements in the demographic transition 
by analyzing an increase in adult survival. There is again an effect on the savings rate originating 
from the intertemporal price structure of consumption: the prices are seen to depend directly on μ1 and 
μ2 in the intertemporal budget constraint (12). Consequently, when their ratio changes so will the 
optimal intertemporal smoothing of resources for consumption (i.e. the savings rate). As such, the 
increasing price (μ2/R) of second period consumption produces a decline in the savings rate (Figure 6). 
A counteracting effect is present when μ2 increases, however, because the marginal utility of second 
period consumption increases, exerting upward pressure on savings.17 
 
Figure 6. Adult Survival & Saving Rate  Figure 7. Adult Survival & Fertility 
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The net impact upon fertility when μ2 increases is illustrated in Figure 7. The increase in the price of 
second period consumption automatically reduces the relative price on children, (κwt-zt+1wt+1μ2/Rt+1), 
which increases the fertility rate. When the increase in μ2 is small, fertility will initially fall, and will 
then, due to the quadratic terms in μ2 in n(μ1, μ2) in (23), increase the larger μ2 is. 
Since the savings rate initially fell, the wage rate will also fall, providing households with less 
income for all types of goods: c1,  c2 and (1+n). This will initially reduce fertility, but the more μ2 
increases, the less income is available in old age and the savings motive for having children exerts 
upward pressure on altruistic gifts and thus fertility. As a strategy to finance old age consumption, 
workers therefore increase fertility because children now become relatively cheaper than capital 
savings. An amplifying impact on fertility and savings again originates from the PAYG system. There 
is a counteracting effect on pension benefits, though: there will be more retirees per household, for any 
given number of children, and this will generate fewer benefits to be distributed among retirees. The 
net effect on benefits is ambiguous, but the effect on fertility, to at least keep benefits unchanged, is 
clearly positive and increasing in the size of μ2. 
                                                                                                                                                                
and a higher productivity growth rate. These dynamics can be elaborated on analytically by reformulating the 
PAYG system in terms of fixed benefits, but this is outside the scope of this paper to consider. 
17 This is the most well-known effect on savings, which is analogous to the result from the literature on ageing, 
where workers save more to finance a longer retirement period (see Chakraborty, 2004; and Finlay, 2006; Jensen 





Since the net effect on savings is negative—due to the presence of altruistic transfers and 
endogenous fertility—the productivity externality on the wage rate diminishes, and consequently 
productivity growth will decrease (Figure 8). The fall in second period income, due to lower net returns 
to the declining capital stock, will render altruistic gifts relatively more important as a means of 
financing old age consumption. As a result, the gift rate in Figure 9 increases. 
 
Figure 8. Adult Survival & Productivity  Figure 9. Adult Survival & Transfers 
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Increases in, for instance, government health spending or general exogenous improvements in living 
conditions are likely to improve health, but it is not clear that such developments only cause higher 
survival rates for children and not for adults—or the reverse. It is more reasonable to assume that 
both survival rates increase when health investments increase. Having identified, and analyzed in 
isolation, the key dynamics of changes in child and adult survival rates on economic variables, we 
move on to study a composite change where both child survival and adult survival rates increase 
simultaneously. 
 
3.4   Child and adult health 
The simultaneous and equi-proportional increase in child and adult survival will produce a 
combination of the effects analyzed above. An increase in μ1 (μ2) led to a higher (lower) savings rate—
thus the composite shock entails perfectly offsetting effects on the savings rate (Figure 10). This is 
because the ratio of the implicit prices on first and second period consumption remains unchanged. 
We have identified three effects on savings following an increase in child survival, μ1. Since the 
effect from intertemporal prices is absent for a composite increase in survival rates, the positive effect 
on savings is due to the effect from a lower price of children being larger than the effect from a higher 
marginal utility of first period consumption. The net effect of μ2 on savings, on the other hand, was 
negative and dominated by the fact that children could be used as an old age savings mechanism. 
Savings also tended to rise because an increase in μ2 would increase the marginal utility of second 
period consumption. The net increase in savings for a composite increase in survival rates will, for 





section 4.2 for μ1, albeit at a lower scale because the effects on these economic variables are 
counteracted by the impacts of μ2. 
 
Figure 10. Composite Shock & Saving Rate  Figure 11. Composite Shock & Fertility 
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The sum of effects on fertility is a clear decline (Figure 11), due to increased savings, which leads to 
more capital per worker, more second period income, and less need for children as a mechanism for old 
age consumption. In addition, children become relatively cheaper when μ2 increases (see the price of 
children: κwt-zt+1wt+1μ2/Rt+1, so fertility falls even further (hence, altruistic gifts also fall; Figure 12). 
Regarding productivity growth, the increased knowledge spillovers on the wage rate will yield a higher 
rate of productivity growth (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 12. Composite Shock & Transfers  Figure 13. Composite Shock & Productivity 
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The results above rest upon the assumption that μ1 and μ2 increase in equal proportions such that all 
effects on the savings rate net out. In a case where the increase in μ1 is larger (smaller) than the 














An increase in the child survival rate increases the number of dependents and reduces household 
resources. Furthermore, an increase in adult survival encourages savings, as we expect to live longer. 
This implies that improvements in child survival should have negative effects on economic outcomes, 
while improvements in adult survival should have positive effects. However, once we take three 
aspects into account: first, the negative fertility response to child survival, second, the possibility of 
intergenerational transfers and, third, the compounding effect on capital savings from adult survival 
due to substitution for less expensive children as a savings mechanism, then we observe that child 
survival has a net positive effect on economic outcomes compared to the negative effect on savings from 
adult survival. 
Existing literature only captures the positive effect of adult survival on capital savings, which is 
usually modeled in terms of increasing life expectancy. In our model, when fertility has declined to a 
certain level, there will be no altruistic transfers as retirees obtain more and more income through 
capital savings. As a result, the “savings motive” for having children, facilitated by altruistic transfers, 
gradually disappears and workers only have children based on the “genetic motive”. The model will 
then collapse to feature a standard OLG model with endogenous fertility—however, still with survival 
rates incorporated. When adult survival then increases further, the impact upon capital savings will be 
positive, in line with existing literature (e.g. Chakraborty, 2004; Jorgensen and Jensen, 2009). The 
existing literature, therefore, is mainly targeted at developed countries, since it does not take into 
account the developing country feature of children as an old age security device. 
In the model, we have incorporated the child and adult survival rates (in line with Jorgensen and 
Jensen, 2009) into the basic setup in Wigger (2004). Wigger’s key argument is that an increase in 
public pensions will reduce fertility and increase productivity growth. He cannot study these dynamics 
in the context of the demographic transition with increasing survival rates. However, based on the 
results reported in this paper we can show that his argument still holds: we examine the results from 
our simultaneous and equi-proportional increase in child and adult survival rates (from section 4.4) for 
an increasing pension contribution rate, θ. We find that the fertility path (Figure 14) and productivity 
growth path (Figure 15) will move in favorable directions: the path for fertility (productivity growth) 
decline will shift downwards (upwards). This finding is in line with empirical research that shows a 
strong correlation of fertility reduction with government provided pensions through children’s care for 
retired parents via old age transfers (see, e.g., Boldrin et al., 2005). These dynamics occur because 
increasing pension benefits to retirees will reduce their need for altruistic transfers. Thus, they can 
save resources on child rearing, and make these available for consumption and capital savings. This 
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Figure 14. Fertility and Pensions  Figure 15. Productivity and Pensions 
   
Source: Author  Source: Author 
 
The key dynamics to take into account is the presence of altruistic transfers and endogenous fertility. 
When the economy reaches the point in the demographic transition where fertility has declined so 
much that the only motive for having children is the genetic motive, parents realize that they can no 
longer save child-rearing resources by switching to capital savings and away from having children as 
an old age savings mechanism. After this point, an increase in public pensions will reduce the steady 
state capital stock in line with conventional wisdom. However, while altruistic transfers are still 
operative, a rise in public pensions increases productivity growth and reduces fertility—and therefore 
speeds up the process by which a country will go through the demographic transition. 
We have argued in this paper that a shift from a fixed contributions PAYG system towards a 
fixed benefits system would even further reduce fertility and increase productivity growth. This will 
happen as parents realize that having more children will not provide them with more pension benefits, 
but only draw down on their resources. While this is an issue for our future research, we expect that 
the fertility paths would shift down (up) even further than in Figure 14 (15). 
The model incorporates perfect capital markets, which is a limitation that should be addressed in 
f u t u r e  w o r k  o n  t h i s  t o p i c .  W e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t h a t  if capital markets were imperfect, the return on 
capital savings would fall and children be rendered more attractive as a savings mechanism.18 Over 
the course of economic development capital markets would develop, and the relative return on capital 
savings would increase—depressing further the savings motive for having children, as illustrated in 
this paper. 
In our model we chose to abstract from education. The effects of education in an intertemporal 
setting are well understood: the quality/quantity trade-off informs us that an increase in child survival 
will lower fertility and thus increase the resources (for education) devoted to each child. In this 
context, an issue for our future research is to incorporate human capital formation alongside a two-
sided altruism formulation of utility (modifying (6) such that Ut= π1ut-1+ut+π2ut+1). This would allow us 
                                                 
18 In most developing countries an enormous problem is access to credit (very high interest rate), savings, 
insurance and other capital market instruments—especially in rural areas, where microfinance is often the only 
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to trace the effects of better health in the demographic transition through a framework with two-sided 




Developed countries have all gone through the demographic transition at some point in history. 
However, several developing countries have not even passed through the first stage of low mortality, 
and many other countries have still not entered the second stage of low fertility. As a result, these 
countries are restrained from the enormous potential for economic gains that are associated with lower 
dependency ratios. 
In order to reduce poverty, it is essential for these countries to obtain high survival rates in order 
to quickly reduce fertility rates. In this paper, we find that a policy rule of child health will aid 
countries in achieving this objective. An additional key finding is that by increasing (or modifying) 
public pensions there is scope for reaching even more favorable paths for fertility reductions and 
productivity growth. 
Life expectancy is a measure that contains information about the age specific survival rates: a 
rise in child survival will increase life expectancy, as will an increase in adult survival. Our 
decomposition of life expectancy into child and adult survival, respectively, is unique relative to the 
existing literature on this topic, where only adult survival (as a proxy for life expectancy) is modeled. 
We derive our results by reflecting on two motives for having children: the ”savings motive” and the 
”genetic motive”, respectively, and facilitate the former by incorporating, into an OLG model with 
endogenous fertility, the possibility for altruistic transfers from workers to their retired parents. 
If either the relative opportunity cost of having children or the relative return on capital savings 
falls, we find a decline in capital savings and an increase in fertility through the savings motive for 
having children. Such relative price changes occur when child and adult survival rates change 
disproportionately, and we find a positive (negative) net effect on capital savings when child (adult) 
survival increases. In the case where both child and adult survival rates increase simultaneously, and 
in equal proportions, we find no change in the savings rate, due to our modeling of survival rates as 
implicit intertemporal prices. Our model consequently provides us with important insights into the 
savings behavior that evolves as a country goes through the demographic transition. 
This setup leads us to conclude that an increase in child survival will promote capital savings 
and discourage savings through children as an old age security device. Such dynamics will ultimately 
lead to lower fertility and higher productivity growth. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that 
as long as altruistic intergenerational transfers are operative, an increase in adult survival is likely to 
be detrimental to productivity growth. 
The existing literature indicates that increases in the adult survival rate will increase capital 
savings and thereby economic growth, but this result is modified in the stages of economic 
development where the subsistence of retired parents to some degree depends upon financing by their 
working-age children: increasing adult survival (life expectancy) will not unambiguously lead to   19
economic growth when there is a savings motive for having children. As economies develop, children 
become less important as a savings mechanism, and in that process adult survival gradually becomes a 
key to increased capital stocks—equivalent to the finding in the existing literature. 
In sum, by targeting health conditions for all generations, but especially for children, we find 
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